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A Review and Analysis of  Iran’s Current Economic Status 
By: Amir Naghshineh-Pour 
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran’s sixth president after winning the 2005 presidential 
election by popular vote. He placed second after Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in the first round 
amid rumors surfaced that the Revolutionary Guard and the Basiij Militia had engineered his 
election. However, in the second round he handily defeated Rafsanjani to become president. 
Throughout his presidential campaign and after, he resorted to populist slogans such as equal 
distribution of wealth, economic justice, thoughtfulness and compassion (mehrvarzi), etc., to timely 
take advantage of people’s emotions during a period of rapidly rising oil revenues and the potential 
threat of a U.S. invasion was becoming serious after Bush’s notorious State of the Union speech that 
put Iran a part of an axis of evil.  
Iran has one of the most isolated economies in the world. It is currently ranked 151 out of 
162 among all countries and 16 out of 17 in the Middle East and North Africa region.1 The 
government of Iran controls more than 80% of the economy, a figure more or less consistent for 
the past 30 years. The Khatami administration, in a major attempt to reverse such a trend, designed 
and planned the 4th five year economic development plan (2005 – 2010) and the twenty year 
economic outlook to lower the state ownership of the economy. A new interpretation of article 44 
of the constitution allowed the government to privatize major industries that it had originally 
monopolized according to its previous interpretation by offering their shares to the public and 
private sectors. However, after Ahmadinejad’s inauguration, the government deviated rapidly from 
those plans. Years of careful studies and planning became obsolete due to the administration’s 
ideological beliefs. 
Since Ahmadinejad took office, despite a considerable increase in oil revenues, the state of 
the economy has deteriorated. The inflation rate is reaching 30% according to Central Bank 
statistics, many factories operate at 50% or less of their capacity, and major cities have daily power 
blackouts.  Real estate prices have tripled.  The U.S. has implemented financial pressure on Iranian 
banks while the U.N. Security Council has imposed sanctions. The president has failed to make any 
prominent development in the nation’s latest five year economic development plan. A mixture of 
massive subsidies, price controls, mandate interest rate controls, mismanagement, central planning, 
etc., have contributed to his failure. The Ahmadinejad administration has become the victim of his 
campaign slogans. These slogans are ineffective for solving any problems. They are only good for 
temporary public consumption. However, he is still going full speed. Much of his confidence is 
fueled by unprecedented oil revenues in combination with his ideological beliefs. 
Central Planning 
The Ahmadinejad’s administration economic policies are directed toward a central planning 
system, which originate from the president’s own mindset. Its main objective is to control all 
markets including commodities, capital, credit, and labor. Although this matter was evident in the 
previous governments, the current government’s interference in monetary decisions, different 
market affairs, and setting price controls in the name of justice and Islamic economics is exceptional. 
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In a major attempt towards central planning, Ahmadinejad dissolved several semi-
independent state entities to increase his control over fiscal and monetary policies thus enabling him 
to implement his populist plans. Management and Planning Organization (MPO) was one of the 
major entities that fell victim to Ahmadinejad’s plans. Before desolation, this 60 year old state body 
was in charge of allocating the national budget relatively independent from the administration. The 
president established a new budget and planning body directly under his supervision to have 
complete control of budgetary policies.2 &3 Another major victim was the Credit and Money Council 
(CMC). The CMC’s responsibility was to study and make decisions related to the general guidelines 
of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and to supervise monetary and banking affairs. Before dissolution, 
the CMC had resisted Ahmadinejad’s plan to reduce the lending interest rates lower than the 
inflation rate several times.4 In total, 28 state councils and committees were combined into 4 bodies 
under the supervision of president’s office. 
Another attempt by Ahmadinejad was granting billions of dollars of civil contracts to the 
Revolutionary Guard (Sepah-e Pasdaran) Khatam Al-Anbia unit (RGKA) and Basiij Militia. These 
contracts were conceded without participation of other bidders and funded from the Oil 
Stabilization Fund (OSF). At first, many reformist members of the Majles protested and inquired 
explanations from Ahmadinejad. They questioned whether allocating such funds from the OSF to 
the RG was legal and whether participation of the RGKA in economic projects was part of its 
mandate.  Furthermore, there were doubts whether the profits from these projects would be used 
for defense expenditures or other expenditures. Knowing that the RG is only responsive to the 
leader, nobody would ever know where the profits would be spent. Later it became apparent that 
the RGKA unit had hired subcontractors to execute the projects because it did not have enough 
expertise and recourses to implement the projects. 5 This was the original plan of Ahmadinejad to 
phase the private sector out of being a major economic player. He certainly wanted the RG to be the 
beneficiary of the new contracts, as he had specifically promised during his presidential campaign.  
The independence of the Central Bank is another matter that the government of 
Ahmadinejad has violated more than the previous governments have. In many well managed 
economies, the central bank operates independently from their governments. The government and 
the central bank have two separate responsibilities. The former is in charge of administrating and 
setting the country’s fiscal policy while the latter is in charge of setting country’s monetary policy. 
Ahmadinejad has completely ignored this very important distinction and has continued his 
interference in Central Bank’s affairs. As a result, he stood at odds with the initial Central Bank 
governors in his tenure and just recently appointed the third one. So far, he has managed to impose 
his government’s views upon the Central Bank as evidenced by the reduction of the lending interest 
rate to 12% below the inflation rate and hence the acceptable rate in a free banking system.6 Many in 
his administration have made outrageous claims denying the existence of a relationship between 
inflation and the interest rate.  Such denial has resulted in sky rocketing inflation. 
Subsidies, mandate interest rates, and high inflation 
To materialize his populist promises, Ahmadinejad has tried to reduce unemployment and 
poverty through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, including large energy subsidies and 
subsidized lending. These policies are resulting in disastrous consequences. Substantial subsidies, 
perhaps about four times the amounts paid during the presidency of Khatami, have produced huge 
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budget deficits in the past three years forcing the government to borrow from the Central Bank in 
addition to raiding the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) every few months. He has adopted the worst 
and obsolete economic policies of the past. The results are inflation rates close to 30%.7 
High inflation rates are the main cause of economic instability.  The economy works best 
when the price level is stable and predictable. If the inflation rate fluctuates unpredictably, money 
becomes less useful as a measuring rod for conducting transactions. Borrowers, lenders, employers, 
and workers must take on extra risks. 
While Iran's inflationary environment has worsened due to external circumstances, it is 
nonetheless mainly a domestic creation. The economic problems are not cyclical but structural and 
ideological. These inflation levels have been partially associated with Ahmadinejad’s efforts to 
restrain the interest rate. In May 2007, the interest rate for loans was fixed at 12% for private and 
state-owned banks, although the Central Bank advised interest rate hikes because of higher inflation 
rates to prevent adding fuel to the fire of inflation. There is an incorrect perception in the 
administration that offering the lending rate of 12% or lower to industries increases both production 
and employment and hence helps the economy, while ignoring the fact that the banks also have to 
lower the interest rates that they pay to their clients’ deposits. For instance, currently the interest rate 
for a one year fixed deposit is set at 18%, which is also less than the current inflation rate of 28%. It 
means that depositors lose 10% of their purchasing power annually. Therefore, offering the 12% 
lending rate comes at a cost for these depositors. These depositors are consumers. By losing 10% of 
their purchasing power, they will likely reduce their purchases and therefore the producers will also 
be affected. This is clearly evident by the massive amounts of borrowed money diverted to other 
investments such as real estate and gold instead of being invested in industries. Real estate prices 
have nearly tripled in the past three years. In addition, the difference between the interest rate the 
banks pay and the interest income they receive from lending activities has caused the state owned 
banks to be highly undercapitalized and receive huge amounts of subsidies to stay afloat. Private 
banks resort to other ways to compensate for their losses or simply lend their capital at higher rates. 
Perhaps this is the only economy in the world that the rate of interest for borrowing money is less 
than the rate of interest for deposits. 
High levels of inflation have also been associated with a growth in Iran’s money supply. The 
Central Bank’s data suggest that the money supply growth has been about 40% annually.8 The rapid 
growth of money supply came from high demands for borrowing capital at the rate of 12% the 
banks offer. This rate is lower than the inflation rate, which makes the cost of borrowing less than 
the free market cost of borrowing that would have been determined by free market supply and 
demand based on the inflation rate and risk. In countries that prices or rates (such as the 12% 
lending rate) are not determined by free market supply and demand, even if the borrowers are 
destined to use the low rate borrowed funds in production, the effects of lowering inflation because 
of lower production costs due to lower borrowing costs would be much less if the rates were 
determined in a free market. This is due to the fact that the allocation of resources in a free banking 
system would be much more optimally and efficiently done.  
Furthermore, offering lending rates lower than free market rates causes high demands for 
bank funds and since supplies of bank funds are limited, it will eventually yield in higher market 
interest rates. For the past twenty years this has been the main reason for many companies to go 
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bankrupt. These policies have already manifested themselves in high unemployment and inflation 
and increasing poverty. 
Additionally, for the banks to fulfill the high demands for their low rate borrowing funds, 
they’ve had no choice but to borrow from the Central Bank. For the past three years the amount of 
borrowing from the Central Bank has increased many-fold.9 
The government provides extensive public subsidies on gasoline, food, and housing. Energy 
subsidies alone represent about 12% of Iran’s GDP, while total subsidies are estimated to reach over 
25% of GDP. This has resulted in a wasteful system.10 For instance, heavily subsidized gasoline has 
invited huge amounts of smuggling out of the country and domestic overconsumption. 
Furthermore, because of very low gasoline prices, automobile manufacturers have had little incentive 
to manufacture fuel efficient automobiles. 
The Ahmadinejad government has used oil export revenues to pay for social spending 
contrary to the fund’s original objective. Many economists and analysts have criticized the 
administration for using the OSF for cash aids and current spending rather than for future reserves 
or reinvesting in the aging oil and gas infrastructure. Billions of dollars are needed to keep the oil 
and gas industries in their current condition. 
In principle, the aforementioned policies have been a major contributor to budget deficits 
and are ineffective tools for combating inflation and unemployment. Subsidies and cash aids are 
considered to be un-targeted and ineffective at helping the poor. Some economists contend that 
Ahmadinejad’s efforts to lower the interest rate have led to excessive liquidity and inflation. 
Furthermore, critics express concern about the inflationary risks of uncurbed growth in the money 
supply. Considering Iran’s vast oil wealth and current government spending, Iran’s economy should 
be booming at the present time instead of average economic performance. 
Dutch disease, foreign exchange policy, and imports 
“Dutch disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the apparent relationship 
between the exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector combined 
with moral fallout. The theory is that an increase in revenues from natural resources will de-
industrialize a nation’s economy by raising the exchange rate, which makes the manufacturing sector 
less competitive and public services entangled with business interests.”11 
Injecting sudden foreign exchange revenues in the economic system forms the phenomenon 
of Dutch disease in a country. There are two main consequences for a country with Dutch disease:  
loss of price competitiveness in its production goods, and hence the exports of those goods; and an 
increase in imports.12 Both cases are clearly visible in Iran.  
The flow of capital into real property instead of manufacturing and service industries is one 
of the clear signs of this economic disease. Real estate as a non-tradable good has increased in value 
many fold because of limited supply and overvaluation of the toman (Iranian currency). This has 
also caused some real estate owners to convert their tomans into foreign currencies and take their 
profits out of Iran. Furthermore, overvaluation of the toman because of rising oil prices and hence 
rising government expenditures has resulted in massive imports of cheaper goods (compared to the 
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ones produced in Iran) to keep up with high demands. Investments in various industrial and service 
sectors have become uneconomical. Many production units and factories produce only a fraction of 
their capacity, because their products cannot compete with similar foreign counterparts. Simply put, 
Dutch disease has led Iran’s economy to a real estate bubble and impeded industrial growth and 
competition in global markets. 
One of the main factors that plays an important role in creating this condition is foreign 
exchange policy. Since 1999, when oil prices began their ascent, the Iranian government has 
stubbornly and irrationally kept the exchange rate in a narrow range with the US dollar (T850 to 
T950), while domestic expenses have increased many times and the inflation rate has been above US 
and global inflation rates by at least 15% per year.8 Hence, as mentioned earlier, the Iranian currency 
is grossly overvalued thereby making Iranian products much more expensive than foreign products. 
Based on this fact, Iranian export products have lost their competitive power in global markets and 
by the same token they are unable to compete with similar imported goods. In these conditions, the 
government has resorted to imposing illogical and improper import tariffs to combat excessive 
imports and to increase domestic product competitiveness and in return has prevented both 
domestic and foreign investments. Currently, many of export products receive heavy subsidies from 
the government in order to compete with similar foreign products. 
By adopting correct and rational foreign exchange policy, for example, devaluation of the 
toman against foreign currencies based on the inflation rate and the GDP growth, exports of many 
production goods will become economical and as a result many foreign products will lose their 
competitiveness against similar Iranian products. This will certainly lead to an increase in the 
country’s revenue, domestic employment, foreign currency savings, and domestic and foreign 
investments (because domestic products will become economical) along with a decrease in real 
estate speculation, speculative price hikes, and capital flight to other countries. By current estimate, 
capital flight to other countries has been around $250 to $300 billion in the past few years.13 
Fast return production units 
One of the strategies that the Ahmadinejad administration has implemented to increase 
employment is the fast return economic plans. The main architect of these plans is his labor and 
social affairs minister Mohammad Jahromi. 
In the past few years, efforts to create employment opportunities have made the government 
deviate from adopting correct policies. Offering small and medium size loans in order to reduce 
unemployment has created temporary and artificial jobs. This policy, originally initiated during the 
Khatami presidency, has continued and even expanded during the Ahmadinejad presidency. The 
Ahmadinejad administration laid out a plan to establish fast return economic units and offered loans 
to these units to tackle the country’s unemployment problem. However, many economists believe 
that these units are ineffective and have turned the unemployed of the past to the indebted 
unemployed of today. In general, the only way to solve the unemployment problem is long-term 
planning and investment that is exactly the opposite of what has taken place. 
To pursue this policy, the administration forced the state owned banks to offer their 
resources to these units. The banks lent their low interest rate funds to individuals who were 
involved in these units without requiring any collateral against the loans or any supervision regarding 
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the use of the loan proceeds. Hence, liquidity increased considerably. A huge chunk of the injected 
liquidity diverted to more lucrative investments and spent for other purposes.14 For instance, many 
of these individuals that received these funds deposited them in 1 year savings accounts that paid 
higher interest rates. Without any work (meaningful creation) and risks, they easily pocketed the 
difference. At present, a lot of bank payment delinquencies are observed, because these units have 
not been able to make their payments. Technically, the state owned banks are all bankrupt. 
Privatization 
Privatization in Iran has been a very sad tale. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the 
government of Rafsanjani decided to cede most of the state owned industries to the private sector in 
an effort to stimulate the economy. The effort; however, due to the opposition in the establishment 
did not properly materialize and most industries remained state owned. 
During the presidency of Khatami, the issue attracted more supporters and hence the 
Tehran Stock Exchange was re-launched and a new interpretation of Article 44 of the constitution 
paved the way for more privatization. After Ahmadinejad took office, the privatization trend 
significantly slowed down, but in July 2006 after an issuance of a new decree from the leader, the 
privatization plan resumed. 
During all these years, the authorities have missed an important fact: a successful 
privatization without a free market system is impossible. Iran has a command economic system 
based on central planning that has greatly intensified during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Simply 
put, the system has been the major obstacle to a thriving private sector. The intention herein is not 
to discuss how to lay out the requirements for a successful privatization, but to mention that without 
a comprehensive macroeconomic reform and adoption of proper macro and micro economic 
policies, the privatization plan will not be successful. The evidence is the bankruptcy of many 
industries after privatization.15 
Price controls 
In 2004, in opposition to the 4th five year economic development plan, the Majles prepared 
legislation to impose price controls on a few major commodities (water, electricity, natural gas, 
petroleum, diesel fuel, etc.) to prevent inflation hikes. The architect behind this legislation was 
Ahmad Tavakoli, who served on the Research Center Committee of the Majles. The government of 
Ahmadinejad wholeheartedly supported the Majles bill. Many economists and specialists warned the 
Majles speaker that price fixing would have no benefits for the economy, yet it would weaken the 
financial and production foundation of the system. They argued that by fixing these prices, the 
government would have to pay a substantial amount of subsidies to cover the rising costs that would 
have no benefits but to increase the budget deficit for the government. The increase in the budget 
deficit would have no advantage at this time but to increase the inflation rate.16 
As was widely expected, the Majles-government plan that was once announced as a Norouz 
gift for the people, badly failed and caused huge budget deficits. In return, petrodollars were used to 
compensate for the shortfall. Consequently, the increase in the money supply contributed to the 
inflation boost. These huge budget deficits eventually began to show up on peoples’ utility bills 
some time ago, often approximately 9 to 10 times the amounts the consumers would have had to 
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pay, had this bill not passed (at most they would have risen at a pace a bit higher than the inflation 
rate.) Majles speaker, Haddad-e Adel, in a very surprising move requested Tavakoli, the very person 
who initiated the bill, to investigate the cause, i.e., leaving the meat with the cat. Tavakoli received 
much criticism afterwards.16 At present, the government owes a large sum of money to private 
contractors.17 
For a while, the price fixing provided relatively low rates for the consumers. Because of 
these low rates, consumers gradually increased consumption of these commodities thereby resulting 
in shortages of natural gas supply and electricity for industries, which caused a considerable decline 
in industrial growth, and power blackouts. And, of course, the ongoing drought gave the Majles and 
government the perfect excuse to try to cover up their failure. 
In general, this mindset, while no stranger to Iranians, stems mainly from the lack of 
knowledge behind inflation causes and price increases. Price fixing has been carried out in many 
countries, including Iran, and has always failed. The price of any commodity cannot be held below 
its market level. Two consequences will arise from such an act. 
The first is an increase in demand for the commodity. Because the commodity becomes 
more affordable, consumers are tempted and often do purchase more of it. The second consequence 
is a reduction in the supply of the commodity.  Because of the increased consumption, the 
accumulated supply is rapidly absorbed. Furthermore, production of that commodity is discouraged. 
Profit margins are reduced or eliminated and hence the marginal producers become bankrupt. Even 
the most efficient producers may be called upon to turn out their product at a loss. This is a 
frequent occurrence in Iran. 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) 
SWFs are government-owned investment funds, set up for investing in various financial 
assets worldwide. Their funding comes from central bank reserves accumulated from budget and 
trade surpluses, as well as from revenue generated from the exports of natural resources.18 
Many countries already own such funds. The funds that belong to oil rich countries have 
received a lot of attention recently, mainly due to large accumulations of petrodollars. In the recent 
financial turmoil, SWFs have demonstrated that they can have a stabilizing influence on markets. 
The largest of these funds is Abu Dhabi Investment Authority with assets close to $900 billion.19 
Iran’s SWF or OSF was established in 1999 during the Khatami presidency. The purpose of 
the fund was to balance the budget at the times of economic distress. However, the frequent 
unplanned withdrawals from the fund have violated its original objective. Although funds were 
withdrawn from the OSF during the Khatami era, in the past three years the OSF was raided for any 
purpose. Petrodollars have flooded the financial system without regard to its repercussions, many of 
which were discussed in the previous sections. Today, there is no clear information and data on the 
balance of the OSF. The estimated balance is between $8 and $16 billion, while the expectation is a 
figure between $80 and $100 billion.20 
Other countries such as Norway, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, China, etc., owning such 
funds have fairly responsibly been able to manage them. Injecting excessive amounts of capital into 
the financial system in a short period of time could have severe consequences. The current 
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administration assumes that money is the solution to any problem, whilst proper capital 
management is the key. SWFs’ assets, and the returns they generate, are likely to have a significant 
impact on a country’s public finances, monetary conditions, the balance of payments, and balance-
sheet linkages. Hence, poor management of these funds may destabilize the economy and the entire 
financial system. 
… 
The government of Iran is larger and more ambitious than ever, yet without any specific 
strategy or planning. There are inherent difficulties that arise when the state becomes too expensive 
and too ambitious and seeks to be the main player, rather than a referee, in the economy. There is 
no doubt that to a great extent such ambition arises from the state’s considerable oil revenues and 
the faulty assumption that the oil prices will continue to rise. Iran, more than ever, is addicted to oil; 
even more than major oil consumers such as the U.S., Europe, China, etc. As a result it is 
overwhelmingly susceptible to oil price fluctuations. Iran has possibly suffered more than any oil 
rich countries from oil nuisance. High oil prices have always worked against Iran’s progress, growth, 
and long-term interests. 
With the ongoing worldwide financial crisis, the possibility of a severe global rescission is 
imminent. That can easily translate to lower oil prices. Since the price of oil is way off its peak, many 
economists believe that with the continuation of the global financial calamity, the demand for oil 
may considerably drop and hence the price of oil may easily go under $50 a barrel.21  
Years of mismanagement, resorting to obsolete strategies, central planning, attributing 
modern economic theories to western ideologies etc. have placed Iran’s economy in a crisis. This 
crisis has not shown itself to its full effect because of oil earnings. A great percentage of the fiscal 
budget comes from petrodollars. Noting that the average expenditures of the government is 
currently between $70 to $75 a barrel, an average annual income less than those figures would be 
disastrous for the country as a whole. The first upshots would be a drastic increase in the inflation 
rate, sudden devaluation of the toman, and a huge drop in financial exchanges.  
Officials’ nervousness about plummeting oil prices is becoming more evident. Their 
attention now is focused on OPEC to reduce production and boost prices. Reducing oil production 
may temporarily increase oil prices; however, with the ongoing financial turmoil and a possible deep 
global recession, higher prices may not last long. This is very grim news for the populist government 
that once pledged to put the country’s oil income on peoples’ tables. The social gap has widened 
under Ahmadinejad’s leadership – the poor are poorer and the wealthy are wealthier. In the hope 
that with falling oil prices and hence deteriorating economic condition, he does not blame external 
forces rather than his own mismanagement, which has come under growing fire from both the 
conservative and reformist camps. 
The Iranian government plunders billions of dollars each year on subsidies, uneconomical 
industrial activities, corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement. The essential steps that any 
government in Iran should take to revive the economy are: allow the market to determine the 
interest rate instead of commanding it, allow the prices for products and services be determined by 
supply and demand instead of price controls and price fixing, adopt financial discipline, reduce 
budget deficits, lower government costs, prevent excessive money supply growth, prevent injection 
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of petrodollars to the economy that has resulted in Dutch disease and stagflation, stop raiding the 
OSF, end artificial overvaluation of the toman against foreign currencies to increase internal 
production and international investments, resist changing laws frequently, lower import tariffs, build 
trust and improve relations with the world to increase competition, and, last but not least, privatize 
state owned entities to reduce government size coupled with a macroeconomic reform based on a 
free market economic system. 
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